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 Industry Status for Bombay Cinema 
On 10 May 1998, in an attempt to appease the restive clamour of the film world, industry 
status was granted to film by the Indian State under the aegis of the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) led-government, the political arm of the Hindu Right. This decision marked a 
watershed in the hitherto fraught relations that had existed between the State and Bombay 
cinema for over fifty years since Independence. Addressing a large gathering of film 
personalities at a national conference on ‘Challenges Before Indian Cinema’, organised by the 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry and the Film Federation of India, 
the Information & Broadcasting (I&B) Minister Sushma Swaraj announced that the ministry 
would place a proposal in Parliament that would include films in the concurrent list, 1 thereby 
bringing it within the purview of the central government (‘Industry Status Granted To Film 
Industry’, 1998).  
Industry status signified a dramatic shift in State policy towards Hindi cinema as an 
entertainment industry. Past governments had made empty promises to various industry 
delegations over the decades that exacerbated tensions between an indifferent and often 
draconian State and an increasingly anxious industry. So what prompted this decision that 
led to, ‘the changing relations between the Indian state and Bombay cinema in a global 
context’ (Mehta 2005: 135) and what was at stake for the right – wing government? And 
more importantly, what could be the possible implications of this new status on the industry? 
I hope to answer some of these questions by tracing the process of negotiation initiated from 
the early 1990s between the Hindu Right (primarily the BJP and the Shiv Sena) and Bombay 
film industry which, to some extent, may have anticipated the momentous decision of May 
1998.  
                                               
1 The constitutional provisions in India on the subject of distribution of legislative powers between the 
Union and the States are covered in three lists of functions: (1) the Union list, (2) the State list, and (3) 
the Concurrent list which includes issues/topics that both the Union and State Government can 
legislate on. Until Swaraj’s announcement cinema had hitherto been under the state list. 
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Conferring industry status on Bombay cinema could be read as an implementation of the BJP 
1998 election manifesto on cinema which promised to take appropriate steps to protect the 
interests of the film industry if voted to power and offered the following six incentives, the 
first being particularly relevant to this discussion:  
1. Allow film-makers through suitable provisions to raise resources from financial 
institutions to curb the influence of underworld 
2. Have automatic certification of films that do not have explicit scenes, violence and 
sex 
3. Offer ‘Q’ certificate to quality films, which will be exempted from entertainment tax 
4. Set up theatres at all district headquarters and large population centres 
5. Create special fund to promote regional cinemas  
6. Introduce legislation to provide retirement benefits to artistes and crew  
(BJP Election Manifesto 1998: ‘Our Policy on Media, 
Cinema, Arts’, http://www.bjp.org/manifes/chap17.htm.) 
In the years preceding the landmark decision, the Bombay film industry was reeling under 
acute crises of arranging institutional finance, copyright violations, piracy and government 
apathy. Bombay cinema demanded industry status on the assumption that it would solve 
many of the aforementioned problems (‘Film world demands industry status’, 1997). Judging 
by the trade press reports, members of the film industry seemed naively optimistic in their 
anticipation of financial investments by the State and the belief that it would solve the 
numerous industrial problems plaguing the industry. Key members of the industry believed it 
was time for a national film policy to be devised since it was responsible for providing direct 
employment to one million people and many more indirectly and to facilitate the 
arrangement of institutional finance (‘Film world demands…’, 1997) as the quality of films 
was deteriorating due to dubious financiers. It was believed in some quarters that even 
though ‘underworld money constitute(ed) only a fraction of film finance,’ institutional 
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financing (could) play a great role in eliminating even this small fraction from the film world 
(“Film world demands…’, 1997).2  
Underworld/Mafia Funding and ‘Black Money’ 
The only explicit reason for conferring industry status given by the BJP-led Indian state was 
to weed out illegal sources of film financing by the mafia/underworld and a large volume of 
‘black money’ (see Shoesmith 2007: 320) that circulated in the Indian economy in general 
and, more specifically, in funding film productions. Arjun Appadurai offers a valuable insight 
into this murky world of film financing, observing the ubiquity of cash in it:  
Much of Bombay’s film industry runs on cash—so-called black money. As a shrewd 
local analyst said to me, there is no real film industry [original emphasis] in Bombay, 
since there is no money that is both made and invested within the world of film. Rather, 
film financing is a notoriously gray area of speculation, solicitation, risk, and violence, 
in which the key players are men who have made killings in other markets (such as the 
grain trade, textiles, or other commodities). Some of them seek to keep their money out 
of the hands of the government, to speculate on the chance of financing a hit film and to 
get the bonus of hanging out with the stars as well. This sounds similar to the 
Hollywood pattern, but it is an entirely arbitrary cast of characters who might finance a 
film, so much time is spent by “producers” in trolling for businessmen with serious cash 
on their hands. And since these bankrolls are very large, the industry pays blockbuster 
prices for stars, and the entire cultural economy of the film world revolves around large 
cash transactions in black money. Periodically big stars or producers are raided by 
income tax officials, and a media bloodletting about seized assets is offered to the 
public, before business as usual resumes. (Appadurai 2000: 633) 
Bombay is thus the site of contestation where realpolitik and the reel meet the underworld 
resulting in a complex nexus of shady financial deals, money laundering, and extortion 
                                               
2 According to Sultan Ahmed, President of the Indian Motion Pictures Producers Association (IMPPA) 
in 1997.  
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rackets that exist due to the collusion of corrupt police and politicians.3 Besides the 
involvement of the mafia in production and overseas rights, ‘unaccounted money in real 
estate, stock brokerage, gold and diamond trade, as well as from politicians and political 
parties has found its way into the industry’ (Gabriel 2005:50). Recent scholarship by Brian 
Shoesmith and Noorel Mecklai refers to ‘…a certain degree of either tacit complicity between 
politicians, the underworld, and the Indian film industry, or coercion on the part of the BJP 
and its allies such as the Shiv Sena in Mumbai’ (Shoesmith 2007:321). 
Relations between the state, Bombay cinema, and the underworld have historically been 
complex making it particularly challenging for empirical research and analyses. As Karen 
Gabriel confirms, ‘although members of the industry are inclined to be tight-lipped especially 
on the matter of political interference and the role that the underworld plays in the industry, 
these are important factors’ (Gabriel 2005: 49). 
In an interview, Swaraj alluded to the ‘convoluted state of affairs’ of the industry and asserted 
that industry status to film would be the solution: 
If you are committed to good cinema, you will have to provide good finance. By 
according the status of industry, we have given pictures the much-needed eligibility to 
seek funds from legitimate places. Thus, a semblance of order is now possible in what 
 has been a rather confused and convoluted state of affairs. (quoted in Mehta 2005:139) 
Thus a simplistic equation was drawn and a direct causal connection made between ‘good 
cinema’ and ‘good finance’ without providing any hard evidence.  
Towards Corporatisation? Implications for the Film Industry 
This new status enabled the film industry to be eligible for the infrastructural and credit 
support given to other industries. This watershed moment was soon followed by a series of 
                                               
3 This murky film-mafia nexus came to the fore with the murder of music conglomerate owner, 
Gulshan Kumar in 1997, and the attempted killing of prominent film personalities such as producer 
Rakesh Roshan in 2000. There have been legal trials, notably of major film financier Bharat Shah and 
producer Nazim Rizvi in 2000. See Manjunath Pendakur (2003: 51-55) for more details. 
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other state-instituted changes (Mehta 2005:136).4 In October 2000, under the Industrial 
Development Bank Act, the film industry was eligible for financial support from ‘legitimate’ 
institutions. The Union Budget proposals for 2000-1 offered concessions to the film industry 
by reducing the cost of raw film, customs duty on cameras and other film equipments, and 
extending income-tax benefits under section 80HHF to non-corporate bodies (‘Union Budget 
Gives Benefits To Film Industry’, 2000). For the first time in 2000, the Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FICCI) organised an ‘International Conference on the 
Business of Entertainment: INDIA – Opportunities in the 21st Century’ that was inaugurated 
by the Union Minister of Information & Broadcasting (I&B) Arun Jaitley who in his address 
gave indications that “the Centre was keen to help the industry which had been ignored for 
far too long” and released a FICCI report prepared by Arthur Anderson on the entertainment 
industry (Sen-Gupta & Gupta 2000). It was followed in successive years by FRAMES 2001 
and FRAMES 2002, FICCI-sponsored global conventions, the first of which was inaugurated 
by Swaraj who reiterated that “the government (was) committed to nurturing the 
entertainment sector and expanding the market size in India and abroad” (‘FRAMES 2001: 
2001). In May 2001, Swaraj led a 25-member delegation to Cannes to promote overseas sales 
of Indian films (136) and even personally ‘designed a special logo to give a distinct identity to 
the Indian film industry abroad’ (‘Sushma Swaraj Designs Special Logo for Indian Films’, 
2002). 
As Monika Mehta points out, to fully understand the significance of the industry status it is 
imperative to examine the historical conjuncture in which this decision was taken. The 
changing attitude of the State towards Bombay cinema should be situated against the 
backdrop of two other significant developments: Firstly, it was the era of economic 
                                               
4 According to Mehta (2005:136): “In 1998, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha granted many long-
standing demands of the film industry, including reduction in custom duties on cinematographic film, 
exemption of recorded audio and video cassettes from excise duties, and tax incentives, to name a few. 
In 2000, Sinha added further concessions including a complete exemption on export profits, further 
reduction in import duties on cinematographic equipment, and more tax incentives.” 
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liberalization which imposed certain economic imperatives on the Indian state, forcing it to 
open its markets to western products and culture, and become a global player. Secondly, 
‘during the same period, both the Bombay film industry and the state began pursuing Indian 
diasporic communities’ (136) since they emerged as valued audiences in Bombay’s box-office 
figures and desired investors in the Indian state’s political, economic, and cultural plans. 
Mehta makes a significant observation which could possibly explain, to some extent, the 
interest of the BJP-led State in the industry. She argues that ‘by designating film as an 
industry, and thereby bringing an “unorganized” and “informal” sector of the economy under 
its purview, the state was actively attempting to (re)inscribe its authority in the context of 
globalization’ (Mehta 2005: 137).  
It is not a mere coincidence that it was the BJP-led government that finally met the film 
world’s longstanding demand for state recognition. Observing that “the rise of cultural 
nationalist politics signified by the Hindu nationalist and pro-business Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) (was an) important factor in the state’s shifting attitudes toward the Hindi film 
industry” (Ganti 2004:51), Tejaswini Ganti points out,  
It is no surprise that it was a BJP government that granted industry status since the 
party’s support base is heavily drawn from petty traders and small businessmen who 
comprise the vast distribution, exhibition, and finance apparatus for Hindi filmmaking. 
(Ganti 2004:51) 
I would like to suggest that the BJP government wanted to harness a powerful, creative mass 
medium that had thrived despite State censure, neglect and suspicion. By awarding industry-
status to the world’s most prolific film-making machinery, the State, under the aegis of the 
BJP-led government, was both officially recognizing the mass appeal, reach and popularity of 
the cinematic medium as well as the export potential of Bombay cinema as a global 
commodity for diasporic consumption and investment. It was also reacting to the process of 
globalization by making the hitherto shady business of film financing legitimate and ‘cleaning 
up its act’ in order to meet global standards for attracting prospective exports and 
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investments from affluent diasporic communities. Corporate status enabled the State to 
officially distance itself from the ill-repute of mafia money. 
In the weeks following the corporate status of film the Industrial Development Bank of India 
(IDBI) issued a set of ‘norms’ for financing films: 
The IDBI has said that to be eligible for its film-financing scheme, the movie should 
have a capital of Rs. 5 crore [50 million] to Rs. 25 crore [250 million] for Hindi films 
and Rs. 30 lakh [300,000] to Rs. 10 lakh [100,000] for regional films. The scheme says 
no two films should be the same and the investment would vary depending on the 
“‘treatment” of the story or concept and scale of production…[added emphasis]. The 
security towards the loan will be a lab letter, assignment of Intellectual Property Right 
of the proposed films as also existing rights on old films. (Mehta 2005:141-2) 
As Mehta observes,  
In recognizing film as property, the state which is formally in charge of protecting and 
safeguarding the rights to property is able to control the kind of films produced. In 
making a distinction between Hindi and regional films and prescribing a larger amount 
of initial capital for the former and a lesser one for the latter, this policy seeks to 
(re)inscribe the dominance of Hindi and Bombay cinema both nationally and 
internationally. (2005: 142) 
Thus, this decision couldn’t be taken at face value for it came with strings attached and much 
deeper implications for the industry. As reflected by the aforementioned norms, the IDBI 
policy didn’t offer easy recourse to film financing. Instead it privileged established producers 
and discriminated against regional films (although creating a special fund to promote 
regional cinemas was one of the incentives mentioned in the 1998 BJP manifesto). Instead, 
‘through a host of rules mandated and enforced by state supported financial institutions, the 
policy sought to transform the nature of the film industry’ (Mehta 2005: 142). While the 
Bombay cinema desired the benefits that resulted from corporatization, such as legitimate 
financing and larger markets, this process also extended the authority of state-supported 
financial institutions through a new set of rules imposed on the production and marketing of 
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films. Extending Mehta’s argument, I would suggest that the State, through these financial 
institutions, could decide which films received financing whilst discriminating against those 
productions it didn’t think fit for state sponsorship. This came strikingly close to resembling 
state patronage and signaled unprecedented level of interventions in the creative process at 
even the pre-production stages of film-making. Thus, industry status could be seen as a 
justification and a pretext for the increasing regulative authority of state-supported financial 
institution. 
I argue that granting industry status was an opportunity created by the BJP-led State to 
control Hindi film production which had been hitherto largely unorganised and beyond 
direct governmental control particularly regarding financing films. This is further confirmed 
by reports of a proposal to transfer cinema from the state to the concurrent list which was 
“widely seen as the centre expanding its power at the cost of the state exchequer” and 
attacked by several opposition-rules states which alleged that the centre was acting with a 
“vested interest” (‘Films To Come On Concurrent List’, 2001). 
In the following sections I trace the BJP/Shiv Sena’s decade-long interventions to promote a 
Hindu nationalist ideology in the Bombay film industry since it had ‘recognized the value of 
film as a political tool from its earliest days in the 1980s’ and had ‘employed film techniques 
to advance the cause of Hindutva’ 5 (McGuire 2007: 8). In order to achieve this, the Hindu 
Right adopted various strategies ranging from negative pressures primarily from the Shiv 
Sena leader Bal Thackeray and his cohorts to establishing dialogue with important industry 
members; giving incentives such as national awards, tax exemptions and arranging free 
screening of films that espoused the nationalist agenda; using celebrities for electoral 
                                               
5 Hindutva literally translates as ‘Hinduness’, coined by V.D. Savarkar, denoting nationalist, revivalist, 
chauvinistic Hinduism that forms the basis of Hindu right-wing ideology and the movement for a 
Hindu nation. 
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purposes; socializing and attending previews/premieres; and using theatrical exhibition to 
disseminate Hindutva propaganda. 
The Role of Shiv Sena and Bal Thackeray in the Bombay Film Industry 
It is of immense significance that Bombay is both the home of the Shiv Sena, ‘…the most 
markedly xenophobic regional party in India…’ (Appadurai 2000: 629) and the Hindi film 
industry. Therefore it is not surprising that the fluid spheres of politics and cinema permeate, 
intervene, overlap to form complex and often unequal ties between influential politicians and 
obsequious film personalities, many of whom owe their careers to the ‘patronage’ of the Shiv 
Sena leader Bal Thackeray. His weakness for the world of Hindi cinema is well-known, 
having family connections in the industry. His father, ‘Prabodhankar’ Thackeray, a famous 
social reformer, had a brief stint as a publicist with Homi Wadia’s film company in the 1940s. 
His brother, Shreekant, a renowned music director, produced a few Marathi films and 
reviewed Hindi blockbusters for the Shiv Sena mouthpiece, Maarmik (Mishra: 2001b). 
Bombay, the home of the Shiv Sena, was the vortex of extreme nationalist politics unlike any 
other Indian city. Writing in 2000, when nationalist fervour was at its peak, Appadurai 
succinctly elucidates the Shiv Sena credo: 
Today the Shiva Sena controls the city and the state and has a significant national profile 
as one of the many parties that form the Sangh Parivar (or coalition of Hindu chauvinist 
parties). Its platform combines language chauvinism (Marathi), regional primordialism 
(a cult of the regional state of Maharashtra), and a commitment to a Hinduized India 
(Hindutva, the land of Hinduness). It has created a relatively seamless link between its 
nativist, pro-Maharashtrian message and a national politics of confrontation with 
Pakistan. (2000: 629) 
Much has been written in the trade press and the print media about the ubiquity and 
omnipresence of Balasaheb Thackeray, ‘the vitriolic head of the Shiva Sena’, (Appadurai 
2000: 644) in Bombay, his nexus with the film industry and the nefarious activities of his 
henchmen and party workers. Shoesmith and Mecklai observe that the Shiv Sena was 
‘seeking to coerce some members of the powerful film industry into alignment with their 
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ideological position’ and also mentioned that the ‘Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray’s 
involvement with the film industry (was) well documented’ (Shoesmith 2007:  321). 
In 1993, Hindi films starring allegedly ‘anti-national’ stars such as the popular action-hero 
Sanjay Dutt, 6 held under the TADA 7 for illegal possession of guns and Pakistani and Indian 
artistes collaborating with such artistes were blacklisted by the right-wing, their films 
boycotted and even banned. This prompted an industry delegation to meet the BJP All India 
General Secretary, Pramod Mahajan, to resolve several agitations that were taking place 
against Sanjay Dutt films and other artistes. Mahajan in denying any such party activities 
clarified that BJP was ‘not at all interested in such a move by which the film industry’s day-
to-day business [was] interfered’ (‘IMPDA Delegation Meets B.J.P. Leader’, 1993). However 
the objective of this article is to provide evidence to the contrary by revealing the 
interventionist strategies of the BJP/Shiv Sena in the daily workings of the film business.  
In keeping with the Shiv Sena’s jingoistic nationalism and demonisation of Pakistan/Muslim 
as the enemy/‘Other’, the Shiv Sena ‘supremo’ Bal Thackeray threatened that he would obtain 
a list of film personalities who attended Pakistan Day celebrations and call for a countrywide 
ban on their films. Having already received the names of two Muslim stars, the legendary 
doyen of Hindi cinema, Dilip Kumar and the star actress Shabana Azmi, it was reported that 
Thackeray would not allow films to be screened in the country even if the sufferers were 
                                               
6 One of Hindi cinema’s successful actors, Sanjay Dutt, was convicted recently, on 30th July 2007, for 
six years on the last day of an epic trial into India's worst terrorist attack, the bombings in Mumbai in 
1993 that claimed the lives of 257 people. Dutt, whose early success was founded on action hero roles 
but later turned his hand to comedy, was found guilty of illegally possessing three AK-56 rifles, a pistol 
and ammunition in a trial that lasted more than a dozen years. See Ramesh (‘Bollywood star Sanjay 
Dutt jailed for six years’, 2007). 
7 TADA, an acronym for The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, was an Indian law 
active between 1985 and 1995 (modified in 1987) for the prevention of terrorist activities in Punjab. It 
was renewed in 1989, 1991 and 1993 before being allowed to lapse in 1995 due to increasing 
unpopularity due to widespread allegations of abuse.  
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Hindu producers (‘Thackeray Threatens To Boycott Star’, 1993). Thackeray’s actions 
exemplify Appadurai observations on how Shiv Sena’s nationalist ideology ‘…sutured a 
specific form of regional chauvinism with a national message about Hindu power through the 
deployment of the figure of the Muslim as the archetype of the invader, the stranger, and the 
traitor’ (2000: 646). 8  
Besides assuming the role of aggressor, Bal Thackeray’s ‘moral support,’ consent and 
approval was often sought by popular actresses like Manisha Koirala before agreeing to act in 
any potentially controversial film (‘Manisha Koirala Denies Having Approached Balasaheb’, 
1996). Many years later, in 2002, the actress would seek Bal Thackeray’s intervention in 
resolving a dispute with the film director of Ek Chhotisi Love Story (Shashilal Nair, 2002) 
over an injunction order regarding allegedly ‘obscene’ scenes in it. This would anger both the 
film industry for ‘taking the help of a political party known for its violent ways’ (‘Sena Chief 
will mediate to end Ek Chhotisi row’, 2002) as well as the ire of the Bombay High Court 
which decided to issue contempt notices to Koirala and Nair, seeking an explanation from 
both as to why they had sought the intervention of an ‘extra-constitutional authority’ when 
the court was seized of the matter (Mishra, 2002c).  
The Shiv Sena leader often acted as a mediator during strikes and rifts between trade unions 
such as Film Makers Combine (F.M.C) and the Film Distributors Combine (F.D.C) 9 and 
assumed the role of arbiter in industrial disputes such as during the troublesome issue of the 
entertainment tax in 1996/7 which was akin to almost divine intervention. 
In an attempt to quell rumours of the growing politicisation of the industry, a vehement 
denial of any involvement by either the Shiv Sena or its leader was published 10 as a page-long 
                                               
8 Appadurai (2000: 646) says that, ‘The Shiva Sena has achieved this suture by a remarkably patient 
and powerful media campaign of hate, rumor, and mobilization, notably in the party newspaper 
Saamna, which has been the favorite reading of Mumbai’s policemen for at least two decades.’ 
9 See Pendakur (2003: 84-88) for more details on the principal industrial production and distribution 
organisations in the 1990s. 
10 It was published in the name of the chief of the Chitrapat Shakha, G.P. Shirke 
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statement in Trade Guide which seemed to confirm rather than deny the extent of the 
politicisation of the film industry:  
Shri Balasaheb Thackeray Not To Attend Any Function Of Film Industry 
Shri Balasaheb Thackeray has clarified that he is not going to attend any function or 
mahurat [premiere] in the film industry. We hereby state that neither our Balasaheb 
Thackeray nor the Shiv Sena are in any way involved in any film project. (Trade Guide, 
3 August 1996) 
Neither trade press reports, photographic records nor interviews divulge as much about 
Thackeray’s insidious ties with the Bombay film industry as does the aforementioned advert 
which reads like a self-confession. Thackeray continues to be an authorial godfather figure 
under whose shadow the Bombay film industry lives, many in fear of their lives and 
livelihood as it is common knowledge that survival and success in the industry is almost 
impossible without either the tacit or active support of the ubiquitous ‘supremo.’  
Besides the extraordinary influence wielded by Thackeray as exemplified by the 
entertainment tax stalemate, the Shiv Sena’s Chitrapat Shakha11 influenced industry 
decisions to a great extent admitting that although it was not connected with the paying 
public, it took full interest and responsibility for all developments that occurred in the film 
trade. According to Maithili Rao,12 a well-known Bombay-based film critic, the film trade 
unions had been infiltrated by members of the Shiv Sena, once the bastion of the Left 
(Communist). Hindi cinema in the 1950s was influenced by a variety of factors particularly 
the Indian People’s Theatre Association (IPTA) which was a theatre movement informally 
affiliated to the Communist Party of India (CPI). 13 However over the years due to the 
                                               
11 A branch of the Shiv Sena that dealt chiefly with film industry issues 
12 Personal interview with her in Bombay & a follow-up e-mail questionnaire, 28th May, 2007 
13 Founded in 1943 in Bombay by a group of progressive writers, musicians, actors, artists, and 
activists, IPTA’s manifesto was socialist, based on freedom, social justice and recognising the rights of 
workers. Many prominent actors, composers, directors, lyricists, and writers from the Bombay film 
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growing influence of right-wing politics of the Shiv Sena there was the steady erosion of other 
political influences in the industry. Particularly significant is the fact that Thackeray’s 
daughter-in-law, Smitha Thackeray was elected as president of the film industry’s oldest 
producers’ association, the Indian Motion Picture Producers’ Association (IMPPA) for two 
consecutive years, from 2001-03, testifying the Thackeray family’s clout in the film industry 
(‘Smitha Thackeray Heads IMPPA Again’ 2000). 
The Indian State and Hindi Cinema: A Brief Historical Background  
It is significant to note that no political party, not even the Congress, had spent as much time 
and effort establishing dialogue with the cine-world as the BJP–Shiv Sena combine did in the 
1990s. For Maithili Rao,  
the BJP's pursuit of cultural nationalism and xenophobia (was) a contrast to 
the implicit underlying idea of internationalism among communist and Congress trade 
unions. The narrow parochialism of the BJP (was) apparent in all the organisations it 
ha(d) formed. 14   
The aforementioned Union budget proposals, negotiations and international conventions 
held to discuss the future growth potential of the entertainment industry initiated by the 
BJP-led government implied a significant departure from earlier decades of state censure, 
highhandedness and often neglect harking back to colonial times. As Ganti writes: “Rather 
than perceiving it as a vice, the Indian state, since the late 1990s, perceives commercial 
filmmaking as a viable, important, legitimate economic activity that should be nurtured and 
supported” (Ganti 2004: 50).  
                                                                                                                                                   
industry had been involved in this movement prior to their work in cinema. From this involvement 
came a concern and tendency to depict the lives and troubles of the downtrodden, marginalized 
segments of society, to point out the exploitative nature of capitalism, and romanticise and valorise the 
poor (Ganti 2004:28). 
14 Email correspondence with Maithili Rao, 6 June 2008. 
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From colonial times the Bombay film industry has been a site of intense contestation between 
the Indian state and Hindi cinema. According to Ganti,  
the Indian state did not accord filmmaking much economic significance, despite the 
fact that after independence, it was the second largest “industry” in India in terms of 
capital investment, the fifth largest in the number of people employed, and the second 
largest film industry in the world. (Ganti 2004:44) 
Rather than thinking of the dominant mode of filmmaking as aiding economic development 
of India, state policies of taxation and licensing accorded it the status of a vice. Cinema has 
been an object of government regulation in India since the colonial period through 
censorship, taxation, allocation of raw materials, and control over exhibition through the 
licensing of theatres. For many years, the Hindi film industry put forward its list of demands 
to the Finance Minister prior to the annual budget, asking for concessions. These demands 
included the reduction or removal of import duty on raw stock since raw stock is not 
produced in India, the exemption of filmmakers’ export earnings from income tax; and the 
most contentious issue between the film industry and the state at the regional level, the 
entertainment tax, with filmmakers recommending the central government to either reduce, 
standardize (it varies from state to state) or abolish the tax altogether. Cinema has also been 
a “problem” warranting the attention of a number of government commissions, inquiries, 
and symposia in independent India such as the 1951 Film Enquiry Committee, the Khosla 
Committee on Film Censorship in 1968, the Working Group on National Film Policy in 1980 
(Ganti 2004: 47-48).  
Ganti makes an interesting argument that: 
 
The roots of the Indian state’s antipathy toward cinema can be found in the attitudes of 
nationalist leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. The Indian National 
Congress (INC) did not accord the medium much importance, most leaders viewing 
cinema as “low” and “vulgar” entertainment, popular with the uneducated masses… 
Both Gandhi’s view of cinema as corrupting, and Nehru’s view of film as a tool for 
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modernization have crucially shaped state policy and rhetoric toward cinema in 
independent India. Gandhi’s moralism and nativism and Nehru’s internationalism and 
modernism are present in prohibitive policies such as censorship and taxation and in 
developmental policies that established a cultural and cinematic bureaucracy to 
counter the dominance of the commercially oriented film industries. (Ganti 2004: 46-
47) 
 I believe that these preconceptions persisted over the decades during the lengthy tenure of 
the Congress Party at the helm. Thus, a striking characteristic of this state-generated 
discourse about cinema was the intense ambivalence expressed toward cinema and its 
practitioners. Historically, the dominant tone about the Bombay film industry was that it 
churned out escapist, frivolous and formulaic cinema, for ‘mere entertainment’ which was 
not ‘meaningful’ or ‘artistic’ enough. Elected officials and bureaucrats throughout the decades 
exhorted filmmakers to make ‘socially relevant’ films with a pedagogical purpose. In an 
attempt to foster ‘good’ cinema and counter the dominant mode of filmmaking (as 
represented by the Bombay industry) the Indian state established a vast cinematic 
bureaucracy. Following the recommendations of the 1951 Film Enquiry Committee, the 
central government expanded its relationship with cinema beyond censorship and taxation 
by setting up the Film Finance Corporation (FFC) in 1960 which later became the National 
Film Development Corporation (NFDC) in 1980. While NFDC has been relatively successful 
in producing films it has never fulfilled its promises of developing an alternative distribution 
and exhibition network. Other government institutions set up to promote ‘quality’ cinema are 
the National Film Archive, the Film and Television Institute which trains actors and 
technicians, the Films Division that produces both national and regional newsreels and 
documentaries, and the Directorate of Film Festivals which organises film festivals, operates 
the Cultural Exchange Programme for films and sponsors films for international festivals 
(Ganti 2004: 49:50). 
Bridging the Gap Between Industry and the Hindu Right 
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Regular interaction between right–wing politicians and influential representatives of the film 
industry characterised much of the decade of the 1990s. Frequent meetings were held, 
charter of demands presented and delegations sent by the BJP to establish dialogue thereby 
attempting to influence and sometimes coerce the industry into adopting its Hinduvta 
agenda.   
In May 1993 the Trade Guide (‘F.M.C. Delegation Meets B.J.P. Leader’) reported a joint 
meeting between the BJP and members of the Film Makers Combine (F.M.C.) supposedly 
leading to a secret deal that accepted the party’s charter of demands. Among the conditions 
accepted were: 
No ridiculing of Hindu sentiments in any film [added emphasis] as also sentiments of 
other religions; members of the industry charged, arrested and under investigation in 
anti-national activities will be suspended till proved innocent; artistes, male and female, 
posing nude for magazines, will be banned; Members of the industry should not criticise 
or condemn Hindus involved in the Ayodhya15 movement or maha-aartis [added 
emphasis].16  
In 1994, a delegation from the BJP Film Cell met the Censor Board Chairman Shakti Samanta 
and submitted a memorandum demanding more stringent censorship which read as follows: 
                                               
15 The demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya, supposedly the birthplace of the mythic god Ram, 
was a rallying point for all Hindu nationalists and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) who had 
launched a movement in 1984, The Ram Janmabhoomi – Babri Masjid for the building of a temple to 
the mythic god Ram on the site of this mosque. In a dubious re-writing of history by the Hindu Right, 
it was allegedly the original site of a temple that had been destroyed by a marauding Muslim ruler 
Babur who invaded the Indian subcontinent in the 16th century. This movement gathered momentum 
in the 1990s and formed an integral part of the BJP/NDA electoral manifesto. 
16 See Appadurai (2000: 647) on the ethnocidal uses of this new ritual innovation by the Shiv Sena in 
Bombay.  
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1) No feature-film should be allowed on TV without prior permission of C.B.F.C 2) All 
vulgar songs, in words and picturization, should be deleted from films 3) There should 
not be any political influence while choosing members on the C.B.F.C. panel. Instead, 
people from the industry should be given more representation (‘B.J.P. Film Cell Meets 
C.B.F.C. Chairman’, 1994).          
An assurance was given to the delegation that immediate steps would be taken within a 
week’s time, failing which the B.J.P. Film Cell would organise mass-protests everywhere 
(‘B.J.P. Film Cell Meets C.B.F.C. Chairman’, 1994). In a press release sent to the Trade Guide, 
the BJP Film Cell issued a strong statement: ‘we warn such producers that even if they 
manage to get a censor certificate, our jan andolan 17 would not let them show these films in 
theatres’ (‘B.J.P. Film Cell Warns of Action’, 1994).  
The formation of the BJP ‘Film and Television Forum’ 
In 1996, at the inaugural function of the BJP Film & Television Forum the Deputy Chief 
Minister of Maharashtra announced that the BJP – Shiv Sena state government was ready to 
create a corporation with a corpus to finance films. The forum, in its germinal concept, 
seemed to anticipate the industry status which would be awarded by the BJP Central 
Government in less than two years. The Deputy Chief Minister further stated that the Forum 
would ‘play a constructive role in bridging the gap between the government and the film 
industry…’ (‘B.J.P. Film & Television Forum Formed’, 1996), an euphemism for overt 
interference by the right-wing in the industry. Nitish Bharadwaj, a television actor who had 
enjoyed immense popularity in the role of the mythic god Krishna, would be the President of 
the BJP Films & Television Forum; a move which highlighted the growing star power in 
right-wing politics (‘B.J.P. Film & Television Forum Formed’, 1996). 
 
Celebrities and Right-wing Electoral Campaigning 
                                               
17 Hindi word meaning ‘Mass Agitation’  
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The phenomenon of film stars joining or supporting party politics can be traced much before 
the decade of the 1990s, a practice that cut across party lines. In the pre-Independence era, 
stalwarts like producer Chandulal Shah and singer-actress Jaddan Bai gave generous 
donations to Mahatma Gandhi’s epic struggle against the British. Literateurs and artistes 
such as Balraj Sahani, Shailendra, Dina Pathak and Majrooh Sultanpuri were closely 
associated with the Left movement and even campaigned for the Communist Party of India 
during elections. The cinema-politics bond continued during the Nehru and Indira Gandhi 
eras. Actors Raj Kapoor and Dilip Kumar were star campaigners for Krishna Menon when he 
fought the Lok Sabha elections against Acharya Kriplani in 1962 whilst Sunil and Nargis Dutt 
and Manoj Kumar had close ties with the Congress party under Indira Gandhi. However, 
despite these close associations, actually contesting an election or enrolling as a member of a 
political party didn’t occur till the early 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi and his think-tank hit upon 
the idea of enlisting film personalities into the Congress. Thus, in the 1984 Lok Sabha 
elections the star actors Amitabh Bachchan and Sunil Dutt and actress Vyajayanthimala Bali 
were given party nominations and there victories ushered in a new era of the star politician 
(Rajashyaksha, 1996). 
However, it was the sheer participatory force of film and television celebrities that made the 
right–wing electoral campaign remarkable, prompting a leading newspaper to label it as ‘the 
politics of greasepaint’ (Rajashyaksha, 1996). The purpose of celebrities in politics was, 
according to the National Convenor of the Cultural Cell of BJP, ‘to collect crowds…as 
celebrities attract people…can get people to listen to them. People want to meet them, listen 
to them. But many celebrities have political acumen like Shatrugan Sinha, Raj Babbar and 
survive as politicians and celebrities.’ 18 Radha Rajashyaksha  highlights the film-politics 
nexus by observing that,  
                                               
18 Telephone interview with Sri Gagendra Chauhan, National Convenor of the Cultural Cell of BJP, 
Mumbai, October 2007. 
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though 1996 speaks of an unprecedented desperation in this sphere, Indian politics has 
for long been associated with film folk who have either campaigned for political parties 
or actually stood for elections…In 1991, the Bharatiya Janata Party, whose president 
L.K. Advani had earlier decried such tactics, proposed the candidature of Arvind 
Trivedi (who would become the Chairman of the Censor Board of India in 2002) and 
Deepika Chikhalia, actors who played the roles of the mythic characters Ravana and 
Sita in the phenomenally popular teleserial Ramayana,19 for the Lok Sabha elections 
(Rajashyaksha, 1996). 
The BJP clearly saw in these popular, mythic figures a chance of extending their reel roles 
into a ballot-box opportunity.  
The Hindu Right’s unique brand of nationalist politics turned electoral campaigning into a 
spectacle for mass participation. Much had been written about the Right’s flamboyant, 
performative style of mass mobilisation of the electorate by political scientists, historians and 
communications scholars - in particular by Arvind Rajagopal in Politics After Television. 20 
Shoesmith and Mecklai propose that, ‘the politically astute BJP drew much of its electoral 
momentum in the mid-1980s from the Hindi film spectacular’ (Shoesmith 2007: 321). As a 
former film critic for Organiser, a right–wing party magazine, and a former I & B minister, 
L.K. Advani, chief ideologue of the BJP, was aware of the power of both the electronic media 
and of films (‘Soft core between the hard line’, 2002). The cross-country rath yatras (chariot 
trails) by politicians dressed as epic characters seeking votes, the elaborate, public rituals and 
                                               
19 One of two Hindu epics, the other being Mahabharata. 
20 See Rajagopal (2001), Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public 
in India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. In his study Rajagopal asserts a causal link between 
the broadcast of the Hindu mythological epic, Ramayana and its catalytic impact in changing the 
terms of cultural and political discourse and therefore paving the way for the electoral victory of the 
BJP. He argues that the broadcast of the serial on national television provided for the first time a 
single field of social connectivity across the nation and brought into salience the differences in India’s 
split publics. 
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yagnas (fire-worship) were an integral part of the electoral campaign to visually astound the 
masses into frenzied devotion and submission. Shoesmith and Mecklai suggest that ‘by 
adapting such film techniques to politics’, the BJP constructed ‘a solid support base for the 
Hindu Right from the vast, already-disaffected constituency of filmgoers’ (Shoesmith 2007: 
321). 
Bharadwaj is an excellent example of a celebrity being used as a political tool for electoral 
propaganda. There was slippage between the man and the character he played - gullible 
voters swayed by religious fervour believed that they were supporting Lord Krishna whilst he 
was role-playing for electoral gains, dressed in flamboyant costumes exhorting the masses to 
pay homage by casting their votes for the BJP. It was an instance of the ‘willing suspension of 
disbelief.’ Yet, as Joshua Meyrowitz has pointed out, ‘because politics is a dramatic ritual, it is 
ultimately impossible to separate the thread of reality from the thread of performance’  
(Gamson 1994: 190).  
According to a veteran politician, ‘Film stars are misused and exploited by political parties, 
but they don’t mind because the spin-offs are good…like favours granted by the ruling party if 
an actor happens to be campaigning for it, or power, money and publicity’ (Rajashyaksha, 
1996). In Indian politics, the party is a brand which the model, in this case the film star, 
endorses (‘Ideology? What’s that?’,1998). Even the then President of India, Mr. Narayanan, 
whilst addressing the 45th National Film awards ceremony in 1998, remarked on the cine 
world’s ‘indulgence in the froth and bubble of politics’ (‘“Industry status to cinema will help 
workers”: Narayanan’, 1998). In 2002 the marriage of politics and cinema reached its zenith 
with the appointment of Vinod Khanna and Shatrughan Sinha, two celebrity actors, as 
central ministers by the then-Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. According to the trade 
publication, Film Information, ‘it [was] for the first time that stars of the Bombay film 
industry [had] become ministers in the central government’ although South Indian stars like 
M.G. Ramachandran, N.T. Rama Rao and Jayalalitha had led their parties successfully in the 
state elections to become chief minister (‘Bombay Stars in Central Ministry’, 2002). For film 
historian Feroz Rangoonwala, ‘present developments [were] both disheartening and 
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ridiculous, star presence [having] increasingly become ornamental in politics, especially with 
the BJP’ (‘Star presence has become ornamental in politics’, 2002). However to quote Joshua 
Gamson: ‘the spread of rationalized celebrity culture is perhaps inevitable, especially in the 
political arena, where consumption [in this case, votes] is so similarly affected by attention’ 
(1994: 191). 
Film Exhibition Sites For Premieres & Propaganda Screenings 
The following section examines the manner in which the extraordinary mass appeal of Hindi 
cinema was exploited for electoral propaganda, using the cinema hall as a channel for the 
dissemination of nationalist propaganda. As mentioned before, the Hindu Right had long 
recognised the immense power and reach of film propaganda, in representational terms of its 
popular Hindi tunes and lyrics, and its unique exhibition mode required by the cinematic 
apparatus.  
On several occasions and with alarming frequency special previews of selected films were 
screened for important right-wing politicians; and politicians were made guests of honour at 
film premieres, audio-cassette releases and/or at film award ceremonies. There are 
numerous photographs of such occasions in trade papers as both politician and celebrity 
were aware of being privileged to be in the company of the other and happy for being 
recorded for the sake of posterity.  
Cinema Halls  and Hindutva Electoral Propaganda  
As part of its electoral campaign, the BJP screened propaganda material such as video 
cassettes during intervals at cinema halls in the hope of reaching ‘a large section of the people 
through this publicity channel’ (‘BJP Poll Campaign enters Cinema Halls’, 1996). According 
to a 1996 The Times of India report, the BJP released a two-minute video cassette entitled 
Parivartan ki Ore/Towards Transformation which was intended for screening in over 3,000 
cinema theatres nationwide and in almost all Lok Sabha constituencies. According to party 
general-secretary and central election committee secretary Pramod Mahajan the 
documentary in Hindi would be shown during the interval and on cable networks such as 
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Jain TV and NAPC. Besides Mahajan, the party president, L.K. Advani, former party 
president Murli Manohar Joshi, the party’s prime ministerial candidate Atal Behari Vajpayee 
and Sushma Swaraj were among those featured in the film that ‘exhort(ed) the people to vote 
for the BJP for a better tomorrow’ (‘BJP Poll Campaign enters Cinema Halls’, 1996). 
The BJP had also devised a unique way of promoting its prime ministerial candidate by 
releasing a song-based short film in 35mm which would be screened in approximately 1,000 
cinema halls across the country (Kulkarni-Apte: 1998b). The song titled Neta Bas Eka Atal 
Ho/A Leader like Atal would emphasise Vajpayee’s oratory skills and leadership qualities, 
clearly suggesting that he was the best and only alternative to lead the nation (Kulkarni-Apte: 
1998a). Quite significantly, The Times of India reported that it would be the first time that a 
political party in India would be campaigning on the big screen (Kulkarni-Apte: 1998b). 
A sequence showing Indians and foreigners alike standing for the Indian national anthem in 
Kabhi Kushi Kabhi Gham/Sometimes Happy, Sometimes Sad (Karan Johar, 2001, referred 
to as K3G) became a ploy by the south Bombay wing of the BJP to highlight the importance 
of the national anthem and exemplified how a Hindi film could be exploited to serve 
jingoistic nationalism, smacking of opportunism. BJP activists demonstrated outside a 
cinema hall which had been screening the aforementioned film for seven weeks prior to the 
sudden nationalistic awareness, appealing to the public to stand up when the anthem was 
played during the film. The BJP leader Sanjay Bedia opined that the national flag and anthem 
were a matter of pride for every countryman – ‘everyone claims that he or she is a patriot, so 
the least they can do is stand in honour of the national anthem when it is played’ (‘BJP uses 
‘K3G’ to bring in respect for anthem’, 2002). When asked why the party was reacting ten 
months after the film was released, Mr. Bedia said, ‘our appeal is not restricted to one 
particular movie. Since ‘K3G’ happens to play the anthem, we want to make a beginning here’ 
(‘BJP uses ‘K3G’ to bring in respect for anthem’, 2002). It should be mentioned that this 
practice continues till the present time and it is only in Bombay cinema halls that the national 
anthem is played to an almost mandatory standing audience. 
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Besides targeting theatrical exhibition, the BJP and the Shiv Sena used the catchy tunes and 
lyrics of popular Bollywood songs to attack leaders of opposition parties such as Sonia 
Gandhi, releasing poll-publicity audio cassettes featuring these chartbusters (Kulkarni-Apte: 
1998a). 
Other Discriminatory, Regulatory Interventions 
The State sought to regulate film production not only through film financing, but also 
through official and unofficial measures such as free screening of Hindu nationalist films, 
entertainment tax exemptions and national film awards which aimed to define and promote 
what according to the BJP was ‘good cinema.’ 
Certain films that promoted Hindu nationalist discourse or were based on the lives of Hindu 
ideologues like Veer Savarkar were given state benefits and screened for free. In 2001 The 
Times of India reported that: 
nearly one lakh school children from slums and municipal schools (would) be shown 
the Hindi film Veer Savarkar free of cost with the help of a private foundation in 
Bombay… with a view to inculcating patriotism and nationalism among children 
[added emphasis]. (‘“Veer Savarkar’ to be screened free for school, slum children’, 
2001) 
Partisan Tax Concessions 
In 1996 The Times of India reported on special favours had been granted to three films 
Hindustani/Indian (S. Shankar, 1996), Prem Granth/India (Rajiv Kapoor, 1996) and Agni-
Saakshi (Partho Ghosh, 1996), the latter produced by Bal Thackeray’s son. According to the 
report, the BJP leader Pramod Mahajan had urged the government to exempt Hindustani, 
from entertainment tax as he was ‘impressed by its “tight-plot” woven round the theme of 
corruption and its debilitating effect on the country’s public life’ (‘Mahajan for tax 
exemption’, 1996). Mr. Mahajan felt that Kamal Hassan’s role of a septuagenarian freedom 
fighter-turned crusader would help generate greater awareness on the issue of corruption. 
Significantly, a senior functionary of the Maharashtra BJP observed that, ‘the film echoe[d] 
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the BJP’s pet theme of criminalisation of politics. Being a popular film with a strong visual 
appeal, Hindustani [could] drive home the party’s viewpoint’ [added emphasis] (‘Mahajan 
for tax exemption’, 1996). Reportedly, Mahajan had also written to the state governments of 
New Delhi, Gujarat, Harayana and Rajastan recommending that the film be exempted from 
entertainment tax in the aforementioned BJP-ruled states. Inquiries revealed that Mahajan’s 
recommendations were most likely to be accepted by the ruling BJP-Shiv Sena government 
which seemed quite willing to forsake its hefty share of revenue accrued by the tax in favour 
of party propaganda through the medium of a film that espoused its nationalist agenda 
(‘Mahajan for tax exemption’, 1996). According to a prominent exhibitor, ‘higher the tickets 
rates, the more the government recover through entertainment tax. It would have recovered 
more had it not allowed films like Agni-Saakshi, Prem-Granth, Masoom (Mahesh Kothare, 
1996) to be tax free’ (‘City theatres to close on Sept 13’, 1996). 
Significantly, the state government’s decision to exempt Prem-Granth and Agni-Saakshi 
from the entertainment tax had incurred the wrath of the opposition parties in the two 
houses of state legislature (‘Mahajan for tax exemption’, 1996). Poet and film-maker Ramdas 
Phutane, a member of the legislative council, accused the ruling Sena-BJP government of 
bestowing special favours on the aforementioned films. In a statement to The Times of India 
he expressed his displeasure: ‘the booming guns may be the director’s idea of love and amity, 
but Agni-Saakshi does in no way merit tax-exemption’ (‘Mahajan for tax exemption’, 1996). 
That such a film had found favour with the state government was not surprising since the 
producer was the late Bindumadhav Thackeray, son of the Shiv Sena chief, Bal Thackeray. 
According to a veteran Bollywood watcher, ‘what (was) deeply distressing (was) that the 
Sena-BJP government seem(ed) to be applying its own rules to favour film-makers and 
banners of its choice’ (‘Mahajan for tax exemption’, 1996). 
State Awards: The National Film Award Controversy 
Mehta has suggested that through national awards the state plays a crucial role in producing 
genres through official patronage. National awards are official stamps of approval that 
encourage producers to churn out ideologically similar fare. As Pendakur observes, “the 
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government’s role in India’s cinema is clearly that of the patron and the police. One cannot 
help notice how close it is to a feudal overlord who patronizes art and, at the same time, sets 
serious limits to it” (2003:84). The State ceremonially endorsed big-budget, family films such 
as Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge/The Brave-Hearted Will Take Away The Bride (Aditya 
Chopra, 1995), a phenomenal box-office hit particularly with the diasporic audiences in the 
US and UK, for providing ‘wholesome entertainment’ and ‘as a national award winner…also 
granted the privilege of being tax-free’ [original emphasis] (Mehta 2005:145). Since state 
awards are quite often incentives to reward filmmakers for maintaining the status quo and/or 
promoting partisan politics it wasn’t wholly unexpected that instances of politicization 
occurred. There is, of course, a long history of state patronage, which, according to Pendakur 
“works in subtle ways to reinforce the power of the state as the ultimate arbiter of taste, 
morality, and the boundaries of political discourse in Indian cinema” (2003:84).  
In 2001, controversy broke out over the decision taken by an allegedly ‘government-backed 
partisan jury rather than an independent body’ (‘Jury’s Out’, First Edit, 2001) to award the 
National Film Awards for best actress and actor to Raveena Tandon and Anil Kapoor for their 
roles in Daman: A Victim of Marital Violence (Kalpana Lajmi, 2001) and Pukar (Rajkumar 
Santoshi, 2000) respectively. Coincidentally, Lajmi’s partner, the music director Bhupen 
Hazarika, was awarded the prestigious Phalke award by the government, a recognition that 
Rao believes was politically motivated and totally undeserving.21 Condemning this 
politicisation of the award-giving process, a The Times Of India editorial decried:  
for cinema’s sake, let’s leave cinema alone. What’s politics got to do with it, anyway? 
Why should a film win an award simply because it … propagates Indianness, features 
artistes who campaign for the ruling party or features the nation’s number one 
enemy…More importantly why should a specialist body like a film jury comprise non-
specialists like campaign managers, dance teachers, political netas 22 and friends of 
netas? …Any political party – be it the BJP or the Congress – should clearly demarcate 
                                               
21 Email correspondence with Maithili Rao, 6 June, 2008 
22 Meaning ‘Leader’ in Hindi 
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its field of activity, which obviously is the political arena alone. …Hard-core ideological 
intonations have led to the asphyxiation of many an autonomous body, transforming 
art and intellect into shallow propaganda. (‘Jury’s Out’, First Edit, 2001) 
Reacting to the charges of intervention in these awards, Swaraj denied that there had been 
any attempt to compromise the independence of the jury and claimed that at no point had 
her ministry sought any lists of films or tried to influence the jury, the members having been 
cleared by her without allegedly going into their political leanings. However she did concede 
that ‘four of the members could be described as pro-BJP’ (‘Sushma denies intervention 
charge in film awards’, 2001). 
Conclusion 
More than any other political party in India, the BJP and its allies were aware of the 
importance of the film industry and recognised its growth potential particularly with the 
Indian diaspora in the US, Canada, UK and Middle East. The BJP had recognised the power 
of the cinematic apparatus as a cheap mass medium that reached the common man 23. It used 
the industry as a conduit for various purposes, not least for party propaganda and for the 
dissemination of nationalist ideology to illiterate masses for whom the moving image rather 
than the written word was the effective means of communication.  
The changing dynamics between the BJP-led Indian State and the Bombay film industry 
post-1998 could be retrospectively traced to the early 1990s when the BJP had developed 
various strategies to involve itself in the workings of the film industry, not least by infiltrating 
the trade unions. Industry status, along with all its benefits, provided the State with a means 
of regulating a hitherto unorganized and amorphous business sector by its fiscal policies on 
investment, the Intellectual Property Right and also by giving positive incentives such as 
national awards to make its patronage and pleasure known. Recognition of the film industry 
could also be seen as a means of controlling content in ways more subterranean, more 
                                               
23 Telephone interview with Sri Gagendra Chauhan, National Convenor of the Cultural Cell of BJP, 
Mumbai, October 2007 
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effective, and less public than through the censorship battles of the 1990s. As Manjunath 
Pendakur observes, ‘investors usually attempt to influence the content of the films’ 
(2003:54). For Mehta, ‘the process of constructing and then policing corruption produce(d) 
another opportunity for the state to “act” and to (re)inscribe its authority’ in the context of 
globalization (2005: 140).  
This new relationship between Bombay cinema and the Indian state was illuminated by a 
quip made by the Finance Minister after granting the film industry a series of concessions: ‘I 
hope these concessions combined with what I have already done on the indirect tax side will 
reassure the entertainment industry that Hum Saath Saath Hain/We Are United (Sooraj R. 
Barjatya, 1999]’ 24 (Quoted in Mehta (2005:149). His use of the title of a big-budget Bombay 
‘family’ film to characterize the changing relationship between Bombay cinema and the 
Indian state was not in jest but an insightful remark about the twin goals of the BJP, namely, 
to globalize in an uniquely Indian way, whilst attesting to the patriarchal alliance between the 













                                               
24 Released in 1999 and produced under the banner of the traditionally conservative Rajshri 
Productions. 
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